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NEOREHABILITATION AND INDIANA’S 
SENTENCING REFORM DILEMMA 
Jessica M. Eaglin* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Indiana incarcerates at a rate of 442 persons per every 100,000, which 
is almost three times the rate of the surrounding states in the Midwest 
region and slightly above the national average rate of incarceration 
amongst the states.1  Even as several states around the country have 
stabilized or decreased their prison populations in the last decade,2 
Indiana’s prison population grew by almost fifty percent.3  Moreover, as 
the national rate of incarceration stabilized and decreased in recent 
years,4 Indiana’s rate of incarceration continued to increase with little 
signs of slowing.5  If current practices and trends remain, Indiana’s 
                                                 
* Counsel, Justice Program, Brennan Center for Justice at New York University School 
of Law; M.A. in Literature, Duke University School of Law; B.A., Spelman College.  This 
Article is current as of May 2013.  The conclusions and analysis are based upon the 
information available at that time.  Special thanks to the Valparaiso Law Review for ts 
excellent edits and the Law School’s invitation to participate in its 2013 Conference, 
Exploding Prison Population and Drug Offenders:  Rethinking State Drug Sentencing. 
1 E. ANN CARSON & WILLIAM J. SABOL, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PRISONERS IN 2011 23 
(2012), http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/p11.pdf.  The national state average 
rate of incarceration in 2011 was 430 persons per every 100,000.  Id.  See generally Michael 
O’Hear, Mass Incarceration in Three Midwestern States:  Origins and Trends, 47 VAL. L. REV. 
709 (2013) (studying incarceration rates in Indiana, Minnesota, and Wisconsin, as well as 
discussing potential explanations for their diverging trends). 
2 See JUDITH GREENE & MARC MAUER, THE SENT’G PROJECT:  RESEARCH AND ADVOCACY 
FOR REFORM, DOWNSCALING PRISONS:  LESSONS FROM FOUR STATES 2 (2010), 
www.sentencingproject.org/doc/.../inc_DownscalingPrisons2010.pdf (describing the 
reform efforts that led to Michigan, New York, Kansas, and New Jersey reducing their 
prison populations by five percent or more even while other states’ incarceration rates 
continued to rise between 2000 and 2010). 
3 See CARSON & SABOL, supra note 1, at 3 tbl.2 (reporting that state prison populations 
declined nationally two consecutive years in a row). 
4 Id. (showing that the national rate of incarceration dropped 0.1% in 2009–10 and 0.9% 
in 2010–11); see PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, PRISON COUNT 2010:  STATE POPULATION DECLINES 
FOR THE FIRST TIME IN 38 YEARS 2 (2010) [hereinafter PRISON COUNT 2010], 
http://www.pewtrusts.org/uploadedFiles/wwwpewtrustsorg/Reports/sentencing_and_
corrections/Prison_Count_2010.pdf (providing that although prison rates had dropped 
nationally, Indiana had the largest increase in prison rates nationally). 
5 O’Hear, supra note 1, at 724 tbl.3 (depicting the growth of Indiana’s state prison 
population).  Between 2000 and 2010, Indiana’s prison population increased by forty-one 
percent, from 20,125 to 28,322 prisoners.  JUSTICE CTR.:  THE COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS, 
JUSTICE REINVESTMENT IN INDIANA:  SUMMARY REPORT & POLICY FRAMEWORK 3 fig.1 (2010) 
[hereinafter JUSTICE REINVESTMENT REPORT], http://www.in.gov/legislative/interim/ 
committee/reports/CCECDB1.pdf.  Between 1999 and 2009, New York’s prison population 
decreased by twenty percent, from 72,899 to 58,456.  GREENE & MAUER, supra note 2, at 2.  
The national average rate of incarceration steadied beginning in 2008, and in 2010 
Eaglin: Neorehabilitation and Indiana's Sentencing Reform Dilemma
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2013
868 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47 
prison population will likely grow another twenty-one percent between 
2010 and 2017.6 
Despite these realities, Indiana has yet to implement meaningful 
sentencing reforms to address its growing prison population.  This 
Article explores the complications surrounding Indiana’s efforts to 
implement sentencing reform by contextualizing the struggle within a 
new model of criminal justice reform.  As I have discussed elsewhere, the 
emergency sentencing reforms adopted by several states reflect an 
emerging theory of neorehabilitation.7  This problematic model has 
legitimated the implementation of emergency reforms by providing a 
rhetoric of rehabilitation while at the same time pandering to society’s 
continued desire to incapacitate the vast majority of criminal offenders.8  
Indiana’s recent battle over sentencing reform proposals concerning low-
level offenders illustrates both the prevalence and the shortcomings of 
this emerging model. 
This Article proceeds in four parts.  Part II sets forth Indiana’s 
current sentencing reform dilemma.9  In recent years, the state has 
considered and rejected several sentencing reforms, even as surrounding 
states have taken steps to manage their growing prison populations.  
Part III discusses briefly the neorehabilitative model of sentencing 
reform.10  As I have discussed elsewhere, this theory focuses upon 
implementing reform to manage low-level offenders in particular.  Part 
IV situates Indiana’s struggle to implement reform within the 
neorehabilitative framework.11  Consistent with this approach, Indiana’s 
reform efforts hinge upon the question of what constitutes a low-level 
offender.  Part V argues that Indiana’s potential rejection of the 
neorehabilitative model does not necessarily mean an end to meaningful 
sentencing reform.12  This section further suggests that Indiana may 
                                                                                                             
decreased for the first time since 1972.  PAUL GUERINO, PAIGE M. HARRISON & WILLIAM J. 
SABOL, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PRISONERS IN 2010 1–2 & tbl.1 (2010), 
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/p10.pdf.  But see CARSON & SABOL, supra note 
1, at 3 tbl. 2 (showing Indiana’s incarceration rate slowing from 2009–2010 and then 
increasing in 2011). 
6 JUSTICE REINVESTMENT REPORT, supra note 5, at 2. 
7 Jessica M. Eaglin, Against Neorehabilitation, 66 SMU L. REV. 189 (2013). 
8 Id. 
9 See infra Part II (exploring Indiana’s booming prison population and subsequent 
struggle to implement meaningful reform). 
10 See infra Part III (discussing some of the inherent weaknesses in the neorehabilitative 
model). 
11 See infra Part IV (using Indiana as a case study to illustrate the inadequacies of the 
neorehabilitative model). 
12 See infra Part V (explaining why the neorehabilitative model failed in Indiana and 
exploring the obstacles the state must confront in the future). 
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represent a significant battleground to the spreading and unquestioned 
acceptance of the neorehabilitative rhetoric in the context of sentencing 
reform. 
II.  THE EXPLODING PRISON POPULATION AND INDIANA’S STRUGGLE TO 
IMPLEMENT REFORM 
Various factors have contributed to the exponential growth in the 
U.S. prison population since the 1970s.13  In large part, the prison 
population explosion has been attributed to the increasing 
criminalization of drug use14 and the expanded convictions for drug-
related offenses starting in the 1980s.15  At the same time, crime and 
punishment issues became political “wedge” issues and hot topics used 
to incite public fear and motivate passage of draconian sentencing 
legislation.16  Legislative intervention in sentencing reform resulted in 
federal and state imposed mandatory minimum sentences, three-strike 
policies, zero-tolerance policies, and habitual offender laws; all of which 
extended sentences for broad categories of offenders.17  These sentencing 
reforms contributed to the U.S. prison population quintupling in size 
from the late 1970s to today.18 
                                                 
13 See generally O’Hear, supra note 1 (providing a summary of leading theories explaining 
the causes of the mass incarceration phenomenon). 
14 Nicola Lacey, American Imprisonment in Comparative Perspective, DAEDALUS, Summer 
2010, at 102, 107 (“Over the last forty years, the increasing criminalization of drug use has 
had a decisive impact on levels of punishment, with a particularly marked impact on 
young African American men.”) (footnotes omitted); Katayoon Majd, Students of the Mass 
Incarceration Nation, 54 HOW. L.J. 343, 353 (2011) (“[M]ass incarceration can be linked to the 
War on Drugs . . . .). 
15 Allegra M. McLeod, Decarceration Courts:  Possibilities and Perils of a Shifting Criminal 
Law, 100 GEO. L.J. 1587, 1631 (2012) (“Expanded sentences for drug convictions perpetuated 
a significant portion of the increase in state prisoners beginning in the late 1980s . . .”); see 
MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF 
COLORBLINDNESS 102 (2010) (“The uncomfortable reality is that arrests and convictions for 
drug offenses—not violent crime—have propelled mass incarceration.”).   
16 See Michael Tonry, Why Are U.S. Incarceration Rates so High?, 45 CRIME & DELINQ. 419, 
420 (1999) (finding that some conservative politicians have used this issue, among others, 
to “separate White working-class voters from the Democratic Party”); see also O’Hear, supra 
note 1, at 712–13 (summarizing William Stuntz’s explanation for mass incarceration as the 
interplay of “politics, changing legal doctrine, and the allocation of funding responsibility 
for prisons”). 
17 McLeod, supra note 15, at 1631 (recognizing that increased penalties for violent crimes, 
particularly robbery and assaults, contributed to explosion in the U.S. prison population in 
addition to the increase in drug convictions).  See generally Lynn Adelman, The Adverse 
Impact of Truth-in-Sentencing on Wisconsin’s Efforts to Deal with Low-Level Drug Offenders, 47 
VAL. U. L. REV. 689 (2013) (discussing and criticizing the effects that Wisconsin’s truth-in-
sentencing law has had in Wisconsin). 
18 O’Hear, supra note 1, at 709. 
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The momentum has turned in recent years away from the mass 
incarceration of drug offenders.19  States are being pressured to manage 
their exploding prison populations in response to both economic and 
political pressures.  Economically, correctional costs are busting 
tightening state budgets.20  Politically, mass incarceration is becoming 
increasingly less popular, particularly for drug offenders.21  Conservative 
calls for reform to address the exploding prison population are 
increasingly common, particularly in reference to drug offenders.22  The 
debate over legalization of marijuana is gaining traction amongst various 
policymakers.23  Race politics also contribute to the demand for an 
alternative method of managing drug offenders in the criminal justice 
system.24  Moreover, polls indicate that the public increasingly prefers 
drug treatment as opposed to incarceration for low-level drug 
offenders.25 
                                                 
19 See Marie Gottschalk, Cell Blocks & Red Ink:  Mass Incarceration, the Great Recession & 
Penal Reform, DAEDALUS, Summer 2010, at 62 (noting that Congress is reconsidering its 
drug-sentencing policies, while states have been debating marijuana decriminalization). 
20 Alex Kreit, The Decriminalization Option:  Should States Consider Moving from a Criminal 
to a Civil Drug Court Model?, 2010 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 299, 300–01 (2010).  State corrections 
budgets have increased by more than 300% in the past twenty years.  Id. 
21  See, e.g., Adam Nagourney, In California, It’s U.S. vs. State Over Marijuana, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 13, 2013, at A1 (criticizing the Department of Justice’s decision to prosecute a medicinal 
marijuana distributor for drug trafficking); Editorial, Unjust Mandatory Minimums, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 18, 2013, at A22 (criticizing excessive punishment of low-level drug offenders); 
Editorial, Too Many Prisoners, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4, 2012, at SR12 (urging the Department of 
Justice to adjust its policies on drug cases in order to incarcerate fewer low-level drug 
trafficking offenders). 
22 Eaglin, supra note 7, at 190–91 n.5. 
23 See, e.g., Kirk Johnson, Marijuana Referendum Divides Both Sides, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 
2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/14/us/vote-on-legalizing-marijuana-divides-
washington-groups.html?_r=0 (explaining the efforts in Washington D.C. to legalize 
marijuana). 
24 See generally ALEXANDER, supra note 15.  Drug policies have disproportionately 
affected black citizens who are more likely to be arrested, convicted, and sentenced for 
drug offenses, even though their rate of drug use is similar to the rate of drug use for white 
citizens.  HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, DECADES OF DISPARITY:  DRUG ARRESTS AND RACE IN THE 
UNITED STATES 1 (2009), http://www.hrw.org/reports/2009/03/02/decades-disparity-0.  
See generally Jeanne Bishop, Where the Rubber Meets the Road:  Injecting Mercy into a System of 
Justice, 47 VAL. U. L. REV. 819 (2013) (illustrating the detrimental effects of the war on drugs 
on the African-American community in Cook County, Illinois); Russell L. Jones, A More 
Perfect Nation:  Ending Racial Profiling, 41 VAL. U. L. REV. 621 (2006) (discussing the pitfalls of 
racial profiling and the disproportionate effect that profiling has on Blacks and Latinos).  
“[T]he practice of racial profiling requires blacks and Mexican-Americans to pay a type of 
racial tax for the war against drugs and illegal immigration that whites and other groups 
escape.”  Id. at 627 (citing RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME AND THE LAW 161 (1997)). 
25 See, e.g., Roger K. Warren, A Tale of Two Surveys: Judicial and Public Perspectives on State 
Sentencing Reform, 21 FED. SENT’G REP. 276, 280–81 (2009) (recognizing widespread public 
support for rehabilitation-focused reform for low-level offenders); see also Alfred 
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In response, states have adopted several sentencing reforms 
particularly aimed at managing drug offenders through alternative 
measures other than incarceration.  For example, recent legislation has 
shortened prison terms, reclassified certain drug offenses as 
misdemeanors rather than felonies, and expanded early release 
programs that reduce sentences for nonviolent offenders.26  The most 
prevalent method of managing these specific offenders has been through 
drug courts.27  Designed in the late 1980s to address the large numbers of 
drug offenders cycling in and out of prison without treatment, drug 
courts have exponentially increased in the last thirty years.  Today, more 
than 2,500 drug courts exist.28  Additional specialized criminal courts, 
many of which explicitly model themselves after drug courts, are 
developing around the country.29 
Indiana, like several other states, finds itself on the precipice of 
change in the era of mass incarceration.  In the last decade, Indiana’s 
prison population has ballooned by more than forty percent, even as 
several states have reduced their prison population by almost the same 
amount.30  At the same time, the state faces prison overcrowding 
                                                                                                             
Blumstein, Approaches to Reducing Both Imprisonment and Crime, 10 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. 
POL’Y 93, 99 (2011) (“California initiated that rethinking [of incarceration] as a result of 
Proposition 36, which led to The Substance Abuse and Crime Prevention Act of 2000.  That 
Act mandated that first-time drug offenders should be offered treatment as an alternative 
to incarceration and, thus, has saved many millions of dollars of incarceration costs.”). 
26 See, e.g., The Omnibus Crime Reduction and Sentencing Reform Act, S. 1154, 118th 
Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. §§ 38, 48 (S.C. 2010) (providing several proposed measures for 
prison reforms); see also Eaglin, supra note 7, at 200–10.   
27 Warren, supra note 25, at 277 (examining surveys conducted by the National Center 
for State Courts finding that expanding drug courts and other problem-oriented courts 
were amongst the leading current sentencing reforms in 2006); see also McLeod, supra note 
15, at 1606–11 (describing the quick proliferation of drug courts and other problem-
oriented courts in the United States since the 1990s).   
28 There are currently 2,734 drug courts in the United States.  Types of Drug Courts, NAT’L 
ASS’N OF DRUG CT. PROFS., http://www.nadcp.org/learn/what-are-drug-courts/models 
(last visited Apr. 25, 2013). 
29 There are approximately 300 mental courts, 200 domestic violence courts, 30 
community courts, and more than 500 other specialized criminal courts in the United 
States.  McLeod, supra note 15, at 1610–11.  These courts are modeled after drug courts in 
their “problem-oriented” focus and desire to create non-carceral alternative approaches to 
punishment in the United States.  Id. at 1591; see also Eric J. Miller, The Therapeutic Effects of 
Managerial Reentry Courts, 20 FED. SENT’G REP. 127, 127 (2007) (noting that several 
specialized courts are explicitly designed after the drug-court model). 
30 See supra notes 1–5 (explaining generally the reasons for the increase in Indiana’s 
prison population).  This contribution concerns less of the “why” question regarding 
Indiana’s larger prison population.  For an interesting analysis of the factors that contribute 
to Indiana’s relatively larger prison population, see generally O’Hear, supra note 1.  It is 
interesting to note, for purposes of this contribution, that Indiana is a conservative-leaning 
state and at the same time incarcerates a relatively larger portion of drug offenders. 
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pressures.  The Indiana Department of Corrections predicts that this 
overcrowding, combined with the rate of incarceration, will result in a 
twenty-one percent increase in the prison population from 2010 to 2017.31  
Additionally, it projects that the state will need to spend an additional 
$1.2 billion on top of what it already spends to accommodate the prison 
population increase and continue running correctional facilities.32  
Finally, the Indiana state budget is relatively strapped, making the 
demand for prison expansion problematic considering the rising price of 
Medicaid and other state budget demands.33  Combined, these factors 
suggest that Indiana will need to address the growing prison population 
in order to maintain its fiscal integrity in coming years. 
Considering this confluence of factors, it is unsurprising that Indiana 
policymakers recently began considering a “smart on crime” approach to 
criminal justice reform.  In 2010, the Pew Center for the States released a 
report suggesting that too many low-level offenders were incarcerated in 
the state of Indiana.34  Commissioned by Governor Mitch Daniels and 
conducted in partnership with the Council of State Governments’ Justice 
Center, the report examined the state’s sentencing structure.35  It 
concluded that the two-tiered sentencing scheme for drug and theft 
offenders amounted to a basic “one size fits all” model and suggested 
that a graduated sentencing scheme could easily reduce the prison 
population.36 
In response to the report, the Indiana state legislature attempted to 
implement sentencing reform aimed to reduce the number of low-level 
drug and property offenders incarcerated in the state.  The 2011 
sentencing policy reforms aimed to implement a graduated sentencing 
structure for drug possession and dealing offenses.37  This would include 
                                                 
31 JUSTICE REINVESTMENT REPORT, supra note 5, at 2. 
32 Id. 
33 While Indiana does have a minimal surplus in the 2013 budget, lawmakers anticipate 
the additional funding will be spent almost entirely on the increased Medicaid recipients 
pursuant to the Affordable Health Care Act.  See Eric Bradner, State Lawmakers Return to 
Statehouse to Start 2013 Session, Budget Is Priority, THE INDY CHANNEL (Jan. 6, 2013), 
http://www.theindychannel.com/news/local-news/state-lawmakers-return-to-
statehouse-to-start-2013-session-budget-is-priority.  Any residual funding will likely be 
allocated to education and transportation improvements.  Id. 
34 See PRISON COUNT 2010, supra note 4 (providing that although prison rates had 
dropped nationally, Indiana had the largest increase in prison rates nationally). 
35 Press Release, Governor Announces Partnership to Improve Public Safety (June 28, 
2010), available at http://www.in.gov/portal/news_events/55200.htm. 
36 Maureen Hayden, Indiana Looking at Rewriting Criminal Code, TRIBSTAR (Jan. 18, 2013), 
http://tribstar.com/news/x1303522042/Indiana-looking-at-rewriting-criminal-code/ 
print. 
37 S. 561, 117th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2011), available at http://www.in.gov/ 
legislative/bills/2011/PDF/SB/SB0561.3.pdf. 
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raising the minimum for drug weight from three to ten grams before 
increasing penalties.38  It would also increase the estimated theft value to 
$750 before triggering felony charges.39  Under the proposed legislation, 
judges would be required to issue suspended sentences to low-level 
offenders, directing them to probation, community corrections, or 
problem-solving courts.40  Additionally, the reforms would incorporate 
risk assessment tools to classify offenders on probation and determine 
their appropriate levels of supervision.41  The proposed reforms were not 
without criticism.  Probation officials expressed concern that the 
increased requirements for probation officers, such as increasing the 
number of active status probationers depending upon their risk 
assessment classification, would create too large a workload without 
proper funding.42  The Governor threatened to veto the bill due to 
amended provisions seeking to partially impose “truth-in-sentencing” 
policies for several types of criminal offenders.43 
Despite these proposals, state lawmakers failed to adopt sentencing 
reforms.  Perhaps the most harmful blow to potential sentencing reform 
legislation came by way of the political mobilization of the state 
prosecutors’ office.  According to the prosecutors’ office, the perception 
that low-level offenders fill the Indiana prison population was 
misleading.  The state prosecutors’ office argued that the data collected 
from the Pew Center report was inaccurate because it relied upon prison 
population data from 2000–2008 but excluded the 2009 and 2010 
population numbers, which demonstrated some stabilization in the 
prison population.44  The state prosecutors bolstered their assertion in 
2012 by citing and supporting the follow-up study by the Center for 
Criminal Justice Research at Indiana University’s Public Policy Institute 
                                                 
38 Id. 
39 Id. 
40 Id. 
41 Id. 
42 See Indiana Senate Committee Passes Sentencing Reform Bill, COURIER PRESS (Feb. 15, 2011, 
10:39 AM), http://www.courierpress.com/news/2011/feb/15/indiana-senate-committee-
passes-sentencing-reform/ (“Probation officials worry they won’t have the resources to 
deal with the larger workload under the reform.”). 
43 Eric Berman, Daniels Threatens Veto of Sentencing Reform Bill, WIBC (Mar. 22, 2011), 
http://www.wibc.com/news/Story.aspx?id=1389314.  Ultimately, the legislature chose to 
let the bill die rather than send it to the Governor without his approval.  Maureen Hayden, 
Prison Reform Left off Wish List of Gov. Mitch Daniels, IND. ECON. DIG. (Dec. 17, 2011, 6:12 
PM), http://www.indianaeconomicdigest.net/main.asp?SectionID=31&SubSectionID=77& 
ArticleID=63106 (providing that the sentencing reform bill was not likely to pass prior to 
Governor Mitch Daniel’s final term). 
44 Maureen Hayden, State Prison Data Used to Drive Reform Legislation Under Review, 
NEWS AND TRIB., Aug. 17, 2011, http://newsandtribune.com/local/x175565583/State-
prison-data-used-to-drive-reform-legislation-under-review. 
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in Indianapolis (“IU Public Policy Report”).  The study explores the 
characteristics of the Class D felons being considered for diversion from 
incarceration under the proposed sentencing reform before the Senate.45  
Ultimately, the report concludes the majority of state prison inmates 
convicted of Class D felonies are repeat offenders and first time 
offenders that committed violent crimes, such as battery or domestic 
assault.46  The insinuation from the IU Public Policy Report, of course, is 
that such offenders do not deserve to be diverted from incarceration.47 
The state legislature continues to consider reform efforts to address 
the state’s growing prison population.  The legislature, in conjunction 
with the prosecutor’s office, is set to propose new sentencing reform 
legislation in 2013.48  Moreover, though legislative reform has stalled, the 
state has broadly expanded its problem-solving courts.  Since the 
legislature authorized their development in 2002, Indiana has established 
thirty-six drug courts.49  In addition, there are eight reentry courts.50  
Moreover, the legislature authorized the establishment of domestic-
violence courts, mental health courts, and veterans’ courts in 2010.51  
Policymakers encourage the development of even more specialized 
courts in coming years to manage the state’s prison population despite 
the legislature’s failure to enact sentencing reform.52 
III.  NEOREHABILITATION AND EMERGENCY REFORM 
Neorehabilitation is an emerging theory of reform recognizable in 
several states’ emergency reform efforts.53  Unlike the previous model of 
rehabilitation prevalent until the 1970s, this theory of reform depends 
upon actuarial models of prediction and evidence-based programming 
                                                 
45 See generally G. ROGER JARJOURA, THOMAS D. STUCKY, KATHY LISBY, KONRAD HAIGHT 
& TRENT SHAFFER, IND. UNIV. CTR. FOR CRIM. JUST. RES., REVIEW OF IDOC ADMISSION 
COHORT OF D FELONY AND SELECT C FELONY OFFENDERS (2012), 
https://www.policyinstitute.iu.edu/PubsPDFs/DAWG%20final%20report%20090512.pdf. 
46 Id. at 55. 
47 See supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
48 Sentencing Reform Returns Under New Indiana Legislation, COURIER PRESS (Jan. 20, 2013, 
12:01 AM), http://www.courierpress.com/news/2013/jan/20/sentencing-reform-returns-
under-new-indiana/. 
49 See Elaine B. Brown, Smart on Crime, RES GESTAE, June 2012, at 50. 
50 Id. 
51 See IND. CODE § 33-23-16-4 (2012) (establishing domestic violence courts); IND. CODE 
§ 33-23-16-7 (2012) (providing the authority for mental health courts); IND. CODE § 33-23-16-
10 (2012) (creating veterans’ courts). 
52 See generally Brown, supra note 49. 
53 Eaglin, supra note 7, at 200–10. 
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as opposed to medical expertise.54  The purpose is to manage criminal 
offenders more efficiently and effectively, at times through treatment 
rather than incarceration.55  Unlike the old rehabilitative model, 
neorehabilitation does not seek to improve the offender for that end 
purpose.  Its goals are to manage the risk of recidivism for low-level 
offenders through supervision and treatment and to use particular 
statistically proven tools to improve criminal justice reforms in the hopes 
of ensuring a more cost-effective and efficient system.  Neorehabilitation 
thus identifies and manages offenders through treatment for the benefit 
of society, not the individual.56  This societal benefit makes 
neorehabilitation particularly appealing as a bipartisan platform for 
reform because the services that may be provided to an offender are 
framed within the language of individual responsibility, permanent 
criminal risk, and risk management.57 
The language of the new penology, set forth by Professors Jonathan 
Simon and Malcolm Feeley, heavily influences this new model.58  Unlike 
the old model of rehabilitation, the new penology aims to “regulate 
levels of deviance, not intervene or respond to individual deviants or 
social malformations.”59  Under the new penology, certain offenders are 
considered permanently dangerous, and actors in the criminal justice 
system seek to use aggregate information to manage these populations 
according to their likelihood of recidivism.60  The new rehabilitative 
model, recognizable in the emergency sentencing reforms adopted 
around the country, embraces the language of the new penology, as 
demonstrated by its focus upon cost-efficiency, evidence-based 
programming, and the use of predictive tools.  However, 
                                                 
54 Id. at 202–03.  Actuarial tools predict an offender’s likelihood of recidivism through 
the use of statistical data to measure the offender’s dangerousness according to several 
factors. 
55 Id. at 201. 
56 Id. at 201–02. 
57 Eric J. Miller, Drugs, Courts, and the New Penology, 20 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 417, 427 
(2009). 
58 See generally Malcolm M. Feeley & Jonathan Simon, The New Penology:  Notes on the 
Emerging Strategy of Corrections and Its Implications, 30 CRIMINOLOGY 449 (1992) (describing 
the emergence of new discourses, objectives, and techniques based in predictive tools and 
cost-efficiency in the arena of criminal justice reform); see also Miller, supra note 57, at 427 
(advocating for a bipartisan platform for reform to the criminal system). 
59 Feeley & Simon, supra note 58, at 452. 
60 See id. at 459 (explaining that under the new penology, criminal offenders are 
“sort[ed] . . . into groups according to the degree of control warranted by their risk 
profiles”); see also Shauhin Talesh, Mental Health Court Judges as Dynamic Risk Managers:  A 
New Conceptualization of the Role of Judges, 57 DEPAUL L. REV. 93, 128 (2007) (describing 
Simon and Feeley’s new penology as a “disturbing trend in criminal justice systems’ 
management of dangerous populations”). 
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neorehabilitation also finds meaning in the traditional penal purpose of 
rehabilitation, though the end goals and methods have changed. 
While neorehabilitation may appear to be a positive shift in 
sentencing reform, I have previously argued that the expansion of this 
new model suffers inherent limitations.61  This new rehabilitative model 
focuses upon the wrong offenders due to the cost-efficiency and 
evidence-based pressures to manage the largest possible amount of 
prisoners most efficiently.62  Studies show that high-risk offenders 
benefit most from rehabilitative efforts, and yet low-risk offenders are 
the subpopulation most benefiting from neorehabilitative reforms.63  
Neorehabilitation also stands to exacerbate racial disparities in this 
specific prison population through the overreliance upon predictive 
tools, such as risk assessment measurements, which depend largely 
upon structural factors that disproportionately disadvantage historically 
disadvantaged populations already overrepresented in the prison 
population, particularly poor African-American men.64  Finally, 
neorehabilitation distorts the meaning of justice in the criminal justice 
system, as it obscures the appropriateness of punishment and even 
supports longer sentences for certain offenders.65 
These limitations demonstrate the theoretical shortcomings of the 
neorehabilitative model.  While it provides a dramatic shift in the 
rhetoric surrounding punishment, the theoretical underpinnings of 
neorehabilitation are similar to those of total incapacitation.66  
Neorehabilitation attempts to incapacitate as many offenders as possible 
for as long as possible, except for those few offenders who meet criteria 
suggesting that they are almost certain not to reoffend.67  As a result, the 
model may stabilize prison populations, but it will neither reduce public 
                                                 
61 See generally Eaglin, supra note 7 (citing to several scholars who positively encourage 
sentencing reform based upon evidence-based programming, risk assessments, and cost-
efficiency). 
62 Id. at 211–14. 
63 Id. at 211–12; see also Christopher Slobogin, The Civilization of the Criminal Law, 58 
VAND. L. REV. 121, 151 (2005) (reporting researchers findings indicate that treatment 
programs targeting “higher-risk rather than lower-risk offenders” is most effective for 
rehabilitation). 
64 Eaglin, supra note 7, at 214–18. 
65 Id. at 218–22. 
66 Id. at 222–25.  Professor Jonathan Simon argues that total incapacitation has been the 
leading theory of reform in the United States since at least the late 1990s.  Jonathan Simon, 
Dignity and Risk: The Long Road from Graham v. Florida to Abolition of Life Without Parole, in 
LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE: AMERICA’S NEW DEATH PENALTY? 282, 293 (Charles J. Ogletree, Jr. & 
Austin Sarat eds., 2012).  This model aims to incapacitate as many offenders as possible for 
as long as possible.  Id.  It is identifiable in the passage of truth-in-sentencing policies, 
habitual offender laws, and mandatory minimum sentences.  Eaglin, supra note 7, at 196. 
67 Eaglin, supra note 7, at 218–22. 
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punitiveness nor significantly reduce the size of the U.S. prison 
population.68  And while reducing prison populations may not be the 
explicit end goal of these smart-on-crime sentencing reforms, the cost-
efficiency arguments signify a desire to save money in the context of 
correctional budgets.  However, stabilizing prison populations is not 
enough to realize meaningful savings; we must decarcerate.69 
IV.  INDIANA’S COMPLICATED RELATIONSHIP WITH NEOREHABILITATION 
Indiana’s efforts to pass sentencing reform to address its drug 
offender overincarceration problem illustrate the shortcomings of 
neorehabilitation to downsize state prison populations.  This section 
demonstrates how the debate over low-level offenders obscures the 
problem of mass incarceration in the context of the proposed sentencing 
reform.  Moreover, it highlights the ways that this debate reflects 
neorehabilitation’s ability to change the rhetoric of punishment without 
affecting the overly punitive perspective that drives mass incarceration 
in the United States. 
Indiana’s debate over implementing reform in the state has circled 
around whether the prison population is in fact filled with low-level 
offenders who could be treated outside the prison.  The Pew Center 
report suggests that low-level offenders overpopulate the state prisons, 
and subsequent sentencing reform needs to address this population’s 
growing representation in prison.  State prosecutors vehemently 
opposed sentencing reform in Indiana and recently produced 
correctional data demonstrating that the majority of Indiana prisoners 
are repeat offenders.70  This evidence debunked the perception that 
Indiana’s prisons were filled with low-level, first time offenders.71  
Prosecutors have used this study to suggest that the “right” offenders are 
in jail—the majority of offenders are not first-time offenders.  In response 
to this political pressure, subsequent reform efforts have stalled. 
                                                 
68 Id. 
69 Id. at 225; Gottschalk, supra note 19, at 67 (“Most prison costs are fixed and are not 
easily cut.  The only way to substantially reduce spending on corrections is to send fewer 
people to jail or prison and shut down penal facilities.”); see also McLeod, supra note 15, at 
1631 (“[T]he scholarly consensus suggests that prison commitments must be reduced and 
prison release increased and return to prison after parole failure decreased.”) (footnote 
omitted). 
70 In fact, more than fifty percent of the state prison population is filled with individuals 
who violated their parole or probation.  On average, the lowest level of offenders (Class D 
offenders) has five prior criminal convictions.  See JARJOURA ET AL., supra note 45, at 21. 
71 Maureen Hayden, Report on Prison Inmates May Shape Next Debate on Sentence Reform, 
IND. ECON. DIGEST (Sept. 7, 2012, 8:08 AM), http://www.indianaeconomicdigest.net/ 
main.asp?SectionID=31&subsectionID=135&articleID=66507. 
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These efforts fit into the framework of neorehabilitation.  First, the 
reform efforts were motivated not by concern with the large amount of 
persons incarcerated in the United States explicitly, but rather by the 
threat of fiscal pressures as a result of this growing population.  These 
reform efforts were designed to be more cost-effective and justified in the 
potential savings they will provide to the state.72  Thus, the language of 
cost-efficiency dominates the discourse on sentencing reform.  Moreover, 
the reform efforts intend to increase reliance on actuarial tools.  Low-
level offenders are selected based upon risk assessments not only in the 
context of probation supervision, but also in the context of diversionary 
program qualification. 
The two limitations of the neorehabilitative model most relevant to 
this analysis concern the focus on the wrong offenders and the distortion 
in the appropriateness of punishment for certain offenders.73  The 
determination of whether the “right” offenders are incarcerated aims to 
exclude the offenders most likely to rehabilitate themselves.  The 
prosecutors’ study attacked the Pew Center study based upon the 
aggregate number of offenders incarcerated for particular types of 
crimes.  Their evidence suggested that most offenders are not first-time 
offenders.  And, yet, first-time offenders are not necessarily the easiest to 
rehabilitate.  Evidence suggests that older, more high-risk offenders are 
more responsive to rehabilitative efforts.74  However, the types of 
offenders being considered for the diversionary courts and graduated 
sentencing reforms are typically first-time offenders and low-risk based 
upon assessment tools.75 
Secondly, the proposed legislation, even if successful, would have 
increased sentences for violent criminal offenders at the same time that it 
would have reduced the terms of incarceration for low-level offenders.  
Currently, the state’s sentencing scheme requires most offenders to serve 
a minimum of fifty percent of their sentence imposed by the court.  The 
Indiana Department of Corrections allows offenders to reduce the length 
                                                 
72 The proposed sentencing reforms were estimated to save the state over $1 billion in 
additional correctional costs.  Hayden, supra note 44. 
73 I do not suggest that the third inherent limitation of this new rehabilitative model—
the potential exacerbation of racial disparities—is not present in this instance.  Indiana, like 
all states, maintains a prison population with great racial disparities.  The potential that 
these disparities will be exacerbated through increased reliance on predictive tools that 
emphasize structural inequalities already present in the state is likely.  However, it is not 
the focus of this contribution. 
74 Eaglin, supra note 7, at 148–49; Talesh, supra note 60, at 211–12. 
75 See S. 561, 117th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2011), available at 
http://www.in.gov/legislative/bills/2011/PDF/SB/SB0561.3.pdf (proposing, as an 
amendment to Indiana Code § 35-38-2.23, that courts order an offender’s participation in 
reentry courts as a condition of probation subject to the offender’s risk classification). 
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of their prison sentence by earning “credit time” for good behavior 
during incarceration.76  The amount of mitigation time an offender can 
earn varies depending upon the conviction offense and the offender’s 
“credit class.”  For example, the maximum sentence reduction available 
for those convicted of murder is ten years (18%) of the presumed 
sentence of fifty-five years for murders, and two years (50%) for a 
presumed sentence of four years for Class C felons.77  However, each 
offender is placed into a “credit class,” which limits the amount of good-
behavior credit time available to the offender.78   
The failed 2011 legislation would have expanded the “credit 
restricted” felons’ classification, thus requiring a broader scope of 
offenders to serve at least eight-five percent of their prison sentences.79  
Currently, only offenders convicted of sentences related to child 
molestation are “credit restricted felons.”80  The 2011 legislation would 
have expanded the scope to include those convicted of voluntary 
manslaughter, battery, criminal deviant conduct, kidnapping, neglect of 
a dependent, robbery, and rape.81  Additionally, it would have expanded 
a prosecutor’s ability to punish habitual offenders more severely by 
limiting judicial intervention through specific mitigating court findings.82  
This reform could trigger longer sentences for many offenders, 
particularly considering the large number of repeat offenders the 
prosecutors’ office allege exist in the state.83  In total, the sentencing 
                                                 
76 See generally IND. DEP’T OF CORRECTIONS, POLICY AND ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES:  
MANUAL OF POLICIES AND PROCEDURES 37–60 (2011), available at http://www.in.gov/idoc/ 
files/01-04-101_Adult_Offender_Classification_AP_5-1-11.pdf. 
77 Id. at 40 tbl. VII-1.  Class D felons, who serve a maximum of one and a half years in 
prison, can mitigate their sentences by a year (66%) for good behavior.  These offenders 
were the focus of much of the 2011 reform efforts. 
78 Id. at 4 (defining the three credit categories that offenders may be assigned for 
purposes of earning credit time as Credit Class 1 through 4); see also IND. CODE § 35-50-6-3 
(statutorily creating “credit time classes,” which regulate the amount of time an offender 
can earn towards early release).  “Credit restricted felons” earn one day of credit time for 
every six days of imprisonment and accordingly must serve approximately eighty-five 
percent of an imposed sentence.  IND. DEP’T OF CORRECTIONS, supra note 76, at 51–54. 
79 Ind. S. 561.  Governor Mitch Daniels opposed the proposed legislation, indicating that 
this provision would undermine the bill’s goal to “incarcerate people in a smarter way and 
save Indiana taxpayers a lot of money . . . .”  Berman, supra note 43.  
80 IND. CODE § 35-31.5-2-72 (2012) (defining “credit restricted felons” to include offenders 
convicted of offenses related to child molestation). 
81 Ind. S. 561. 
82 Id. (applying the credit restricted felon status to habitual offenders and habitual 
substance offenders and restricting judicial discretion to reduce sentences for habitual drug 
offenders). 
83 It is estimated that if the proposed legislation had passed, the state would have had to 
build three new prisons to accommodate the likely increases in prison time for certain 
offenders.  ACLU, SMART REFORM IS POSSIBLE:  STATES REDUCING INCARCERATION RATES 
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reforms proposed by the Senate Committee, though ultimately failing, 
reflected the distorted view of justice perpetuated in the 
neorehabilitative framework—rehabilitation for some, but harsher 
punishment for most.  And the proposed sentencing reform leaves the 
bulk of the harsher punishments untouched. 
V.  INDIANA AS A BATTLEGROUND STATE IN NEOREHABILITATIVE REFORM:  
FIGHTING THE BATTLE VERSUS WINNING THE WAR 
Indiana has the opportunity to implement criminal justice reforms 
that may affect the longevity of the era of mass incarceration.  Several 
factors are present to allow meaningful sentencing reform to address 
overincareration in the state.  However, in adopting the neorehabilitative 
model, Indiana illustrates the potential shortcomings of such a 
framework.  There is a danger that states will be so consumed with 
potential cost-savings that any type of reform that appears to address 
this growing population will be accepted, no matter how ineffective such 
reform may be.  Moreover, there is a very real possibility that the 
institutionalization of specialized courts and risk assessment tools may 
create such a small pool of diversion-qualified offenders that such 
reforms may not address the actual problem of overincarceration.84 
As it turns out, the neorehabilitative-based reforms proposed in 
Indiana failed to garner sufficient support for passage.  Governor 
Daniels rejected the amended bill as costly and ineffective.85  Though the 
original bill was criticized as soft on crime, Daniels himself refused to 
support the revised bill that emerged from the Senate Committee 
because it would not lead to the fiscal savings he initially sought in 
proposing the bill.86  This rejection suggests hope that the 
neorehabilitative model does not have to lead to the further expansion of 
the incapacitation-heavy reforms that led to the problem of mass 
incarceration in the first place.  This will require policymakers to 
endeavor to do more than appear to be concerned with the problems of 
overincarceration and truly to seek to change the causes, both sentencing 
                                                                                                             
AND COSTS WHILE PROTECTING COMMUNITIES 56 (2011) [hereinafter ACLU REPORT], 
http://www.aclu.org/files/assets/smartreformispossible.pdf. 
84  Eaglin, supra note 7, at 213–14 (explaining that while offenders sentenced to life 
without parole are one of the largest growing incarcerated populations in the country, such 
offenders are systematically excluded form early release reforms). 
85 ACLU REPORT, supra note 83, at 56.  
86 Eric Bradner, Indiana Gov. Daniels’ Sentencing Bill Tweaked; Benefits Now Unknown, 
COURIER PRESS (Feb. 14, 2011, 11:59 PM), http://www.courierpress.com/news/2011/feb/ 
14/prison-bill-tweaked-benefits-now-unknown/. 
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policies and social issues, which led to the problem of overincarceration 
in the first place. 
Indiana has the opportunity to implement bipartisan reform that 
does more than manipulate the rhetoric of rehabilitation.  The state has 
the opportunity to revise its sentencing structure because the current 
structure is excessively punitive and mass incarceration is unsustainable.  
The addition of sentencing policies that increase punishment for large 
portions of the criminal offender population are not necessary to make 
this small improvement.  Thus far, the state has avoided falling prey to 
the obscured costs of neorehabilitation.  It remains to be seen whether 
this resistance will result in stagnation in any kind of sentencing reform 
whatsoever or result in better and truly smarter reforms, which will 
reduce the pressures of mass incarceration on the state.87  Ultimately, 
lawmakers and the public more generally will have to reach the 
underlying normative question of whether total incapacitation has 
reached its zenith.  Reforms that aim to prevent most offenders from 
serving the most amount of time in prison possible would signal that the 
shift is occurring.  However, the implementation of reforms that 
lengthen the terms of incarceration for other subpopulations of criminal 
offenders would suggest that the rhetoric of rehabilitation does nothing 
to affect society’s continued desire to remove criminal offenders from 
society permanently. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
For the first time since the 1970s, using the term “rehabilitation” 
carries a positive connotation with certain offenders and in certain 
contexts within the criminal justice system.  This may or may not be a 
positive shift in policymaking.  Neorehabilitation permits rhetoric more 
acceptable to the public while obscuring the reality of offender 
management rather than criminal justice.  If Indiana is any indication, 
neorehabilitation suffers from limitations that may be insurmountable—
particularly the focus upon the wrong offenders.  At the same time, the 
state’s rejection of emergency sentencing reforms, falling prey to the 
                                                 
87 Sentencing reforms were not a priority in the 2012 term, because there was a lack of 
political will after the flawed 2011 bill failed to pass.  Hayden, supra note 36.  In April 2013, 
the House reintroduced a bill to make various changes to the criminal code.  See H.B. 1006, 
118th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2013).  The bill introduces several mandatory 
minimum sentences depending upon the felony level of conviction.  Id.  It also increases the 
state’s ability to prosecute offenders as habitual offenders.  Id.  Furthermore, the bill 
reduces the maximum earned credit time available so that no offender, even in the most 
favorable credit category, earns release after serving fifty percent of his or her sentence.  Id.  
The persistence of some of these reforms may suggest that at least some of the inherent 
limitations of the neorehabilitative model are here to stay. 
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total-incapacitation-friendly reforms as a trade-off for some headway in 
addressing low-level offenders, also provides hope that such reforms do 
not have to become the standard.  Indiana, like states across the country, 
can do better within or outside the neorehabilitative framework.  It 
remains to be seen if they will. 
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